MICHAEL J. MULLIN

"I am ready to stake my reputation on my record"

Senator Richard F. Pettigrew's Failed Crusade to Prevent Hawaiian Annexation, 1893–1898

On 17 January 1893, a group of revolutionaries intent on making Hawaii part of the United States overthrew Queen Liliuokalani, ruler of the Kingdom of Hawaii. The push for Hawaiian annexation would eventually win support in the United States Congress, but not without opposition from some lawmakers who viewed the action as imperialism. One of the anti-imperialists was South Dakota Senator Richard Franklin Pettigrew, who had represented Dakota Territory in the Senate before serving the new state of South Dakota in the same chamber. In an 1898 speech, Pettigrew warned that the United States government would "join the robber nations of the world" if it proceeded with annexation.[1] Pettigrew's stand against annexation, and the political cost to him as a result, help to illuminate that controversial issue of the 1890s.

Congress had first considered a bill to annex the Kingdom of Hawaii in 1852, when those petitioning for annexation included missionaries, sugar planters, and businessmen who wanted domestic steamer connections with San Francisco. Hawaiian sugar planters made enormous profits during the American Civil War, despite having to pay a 30 percent tariff, but the acreage devoted to sugar soared after an 1875 treaty that gave Hawaiian sugar duty-free access to United States markets—a concession Congress granted partly out of fear that Great Britain would try to make Hawaii a colony. The treaty was renewed in 1887 along with a provision that allowed the United States Navy to use Pearl Harbor. However, the McKinley Tariff of 1890 ended that special trading status for Hawaii by removing the duty on all imported sugar. To compensate domestic producers for the added competition in the

1. *Los Angeles Herald*, 3 July 1898.

marketplace, the tariff also added a subsidy of two cents per pound for American sugar growers, an incentive not available to Hawaiian producers. One effect of the McKinley Tariff in Hawaii was to make some business interests all the more eager for annexation.[2]

Before Hawaii could be attached to the United States, however, the revolutionaries needed to secure Queen Liliuokalani's abdication. They wanted to convince the queen that formally relinquishing the throne was the only real choice for herself and for the Kanaka Maoli (native Hawaiians) whose rights she sought to protect from further erosion by outside interests.[3] To accomplish this task, thirteen men constituting a "Committee of Safety" convened and requested the presence of Joseph Oliver Carter, a friend of the queen who was descended from an American family that had relocated to Hawaii in the 1830s. Carter's wealth and background placed him within the social circle of the revolutionaries, most of whom had American or European roots, but he was no friend of the coup.[4]

2. Ruth Tabrah, *Hawaii: A Bicentennial History* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1980), pp. 63, 70, 85; Gilbert C. Fite and Jim E. Reese, *An Economic History of the United States*, 2d ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), p. 468; Julia Flynn Siler, *Lost Kingdom: Hawaii's Last Queen, the Sugar Kings, and America's First Imperial Adventure* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2012), p. 165.

3. The term "Kanaka Maoli" describes native Hawaiians, many of whom could trace their family origins to the time before Kamehameha the Great, who became ruler of all the Hawaiian Islands by 1810. In contrast were the immigrants, or "haole," which translates to "those who had no breath," although not all of them supported the overthrow. The Kanaka Maoli were the most insistent in their efforts to re-establish the Hawaiian monarchy in the 1890s. *See* Derek H. Kauanoe and Breann Swann Nu'uhiwa, "We Are Who We Thought We Were: Congress' Authority to Recognize a Native Hawaiian Polity United by Common Descent," *Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal* 13 (2012): 130, 140, 144.

4. Carter to R. F. Pettigrew, 5 Feb. 1898, Letters to J. O. Carter, April 18, 1894–November 23, 1900, Hutchinson Box 1.3, Ms. Grp. 144 (hereafter cited Letters to Carter), Bernice Pauahi Bishop Museum, Honolulu; Siler, *Lost Kingdom*, pp. xxv–xxx, 199–244. Of the committee's thirteen members, four were born in Hawaii of American parents, three were naturalized Hawaiian citizens (from American, German, and Tasmanian backgrounds), one was German, and one was Scottish. Rich Budnick, *Stolen Kingdom: An American Conspiracy* (Honolulu: Aloha Press, 1992), p. 105. The Carter family made Honolulu its home beginning in 1833. Born in Honolulu in 1835, Joseph Oliver Carter, Jr., was educated in New England but returned to Honolulu to pursue business interests. His family was close to the royal family, attending marriages and funerals and socializing

Once he arrived at the government building in Honolulu at 5:00 p.m. on 17 January, either Sanford B. Dole, soon to become president of the Hawaiian Republic, or one of his associates informed Carter that the queen was being "deposed" and that the group wanted his assistance in persuading her to surrender the throne peacefully. An hour later, Carter accompanied Dole and others to the Iolani Palace, where Carter watched the revolutionaries make their demands. They agreed in the end to allow the queen to make a direct appeal to Washington, D.C. In her letter to President Benjamin Harrison, Queen Liliuokalani made it clear that she had abdicated to avoid any "loss of life" and that the American "minister plenipotentiary" to Hawaii, John L. Stevens, had been instrumental in helping to stage the coup. She "yielded authority," she wrote, "until such time as the Government of the United States" reinstated her "as the constitutional sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands."[5]

Queen Liliuokalani's letter of protest on 17 January 1893 and President Dole's letter thirteen days later telling Ambassador Stevens the new government could not maintain itself and therefore needed the protection of the United States forced American politicians to address a series of issues that continue to dominate political discourse to this day.[6] Among those questions were whether the United States should involve itself in overseas state-building and, if so, what did such involvement really entail? Could America afford to embark on "imperial" policies in the midst of economic distress at home? Could the United

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with them. G. R. Carter, *Joseph Oliver Carter: The Founder of the Carter Family in Hawaii, with a Brief Genealogy* (Honolulu: *Star-Advertiser*, 1915), pp. 4, 6, 14. Carter served as the queen's confidant while she was in Washington, D.C., during the annexation debates. *See* his correspondence with Queen Liliuokalani, Folder 152, Box 19, M-93, Liliuokalani Collection, Hawaii State Archives, Honolulu.

5. Carter to Pettigrew, 5 Feb. 1898. Harrison, then nearing the end of his presidency, found the note so problematic when he introduced the whole affair to Congress in February 1893 that he included the line "The overthrow of the monarchy was not in any way promoted by this Government." Whether he was referring to his administration or the United States government is unclear. *See Papers Relating to the Annexation of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1893), p. 1.

6. R. F. Pettigrew, *Triumphant Plutocracy: The Story of American Public Life from 1870 to 1920* (New York: Academy Press, 1922), p. 319.

States bring democracy to those unfamiliar with such a political system? Was the federal government becoming too powerful?

Two prevailing realities gave the foreign-policy debates of the 1890s an immediacy they might not otherwise have had. First, the government that emerged from the revolution in the Kingdom of Hawaii offered itself to the United States, in essence posing the question of whether America would become a colonizing power along the lines of England and France. The second reality was the Panic of 1893, an economic depression that produced lingering effects for the remainder of the 1890s. The debates over Hawaii eventually became intertwined with America's domestic economic situation and with the events leading up to war between the United States and Spain in 1898.[7]

Somewhat ironically, the senior senator from landlocked South Dakota, Richard F. Pettigrew, played a significant part in the foreign-policy debates over the future of the Hawaiian Islands. Pettigrew does not appear very often, or in a very flattering light, in studies of America's foreign policy in the late 1890s. When he does appear, it is usually for some acerbic comment criticizing his opponents or in passing reference as a "silverite" or "silver Republican."[8] Yet the senator deserves to be better known as a reasonable representative of the anti-imperialist movement.

Pettigrew had gone on record opposing new territorial acquisitions as early as 1890, and he consistently voted against Hawaiian annexation

7. For more on the Panic of 1893, *see* Fite and Reese, *Economic History of the United States*, pp. 303–7. For a discussion of expansionism, including the war with Spain, between 1893–1901, *see* George Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U. S. Foreign Relations since 1776* (London: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 299–336.

8. Robert L. Beisner, *Twelve against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists, 1898–1900* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), p. 149; David Healy, *US Expansionism: The Imperialist Urge in the 1890s* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970), p. 25. Pettigrew was seen as a "silverite" because he sided with those who favored "abundant currency" including silver coinage at a ratio of 16 to 1 (16 ounces of silver would have the value of 1 ounce of gold), the same ratio of silver to gold before Congress stopped the coinage of silver dollars in 1873. Like other free-silver advocates, he believed more money in circulation would make it easier for people such as farmers to borrow money when necessary and to pay off debt. Wayne Fanebust, *Echoes of November: The Life and Times of Senator R. F. Pettigrew of South Dakota* ([Sioux Falls, S.Dak.]: By the Author, 1997), pp. 244–45; Fite and Reese, *Economic History of the United States*, pp. 479–80. *See also* Daniel B. Schirmer,

throughout the entire decade.[9] Unlike Colorado Senator Henry M. Teller or Senator George F. Hoar of Massachusetts, Republican leaders could not bring Pettigrew into line with the majority Republican view, which favored annexation. Pettigrew's contemporaries certainly saw him as a determined foe. Massachusetts Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, for example, wrote to Theodore Roosevelt in June 1898—the month after Roosevelt had resigned his post as assistant secretary of the Navy to lead the volunteer cavalry unit known as the Rough Riders into Cuba—that a resolution to annex Hawaii had just passed the House of Representatives by a "magnificent majority" but that Pettigrew and Senator Stephen M. White from California were leading a "dogged filibuster" in the Senate.[10] As for Roosevelt, he included Pettigrew among a handful of politicians who took political positions "no patriotic American should" on a range of issues from military spending to declarations of war.[11]

An examination of Pettigrew's opposition to Hawaiian annexation provides a better understanding of the man's political philosophy, as well as that of the anti-imperialists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[12] The senator's anti-annexation positions also provide a way to look anew at the Populist ideas that influenced him in the 1890s. As did most Populists, he worried about the centralizing power of the federal government. For Pettigrew and others, American annexation of Hawaii was not only unconstitutional[13] but also an opportu-

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Republic or Empire: American Resistance to the Philippine War (Cambridge, Mass: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1972), pp. 108–10, 123–24; Lewis L. Gould, *The Presidency of William McKinley* (Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1980), p. 225.

9. Fanebust, *Echoes of November*, p. 300.

10. Lodge to Roosevelt, 24 June 1898, in *Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884–1918*, 2 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner & Sons, 1925), 1:312–14.

11. Roosevelt to Lodge, 2 Mar. 1899, ibid., 1:393.

12. This reassessment seems timely, given the importance of Pettigrew in studies of the same topic coming out of Hawaii. *See* Noenoe Silva, *Aloha Betrayed: Native Hawaiian Resistance to American Colonialism* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2004), pp. 157–58, and Neil Thomas Proto, *The Rights of My People: Liliuokalani's Enduring Battle with the United States, 1893–1917* (New York: Algora Publishing, 2009), pp. 57–59.

13. Pettigrew to W. R. Hearst, 17 June 1898, Letter Book, 12 May–4 July 1898, pp. 333–35, Pettigrew Home and Museum (hereafter PHM), Sioux Falls, S.Dak.

nity to oppose what historian Michael Kazin has called "the corporate order that had grown to maturity since the Civil War."[14] Whatever Pettigrew's reasons for opposing annexation, Hawaiians were grateful. Queen Liliuokalani not only visited the senator when she traveled to Washington, D.C., in November 1897, she also gave him a token of royal affection—a walking cane.[15]

Pettigrew's arguments against annexation represented a consistent political position that pre-dated South Dakota statehood but was, by the 1890s, out of touch with the emerging Republican Party of the early twentieth century. There are a number of reasons why Pettigrew appears only in passing in studies concerning the anti-imperialists and America's quest for empire. First, he was on the losing side of the years-long debate; America annexed Hawaii by joint resolution in July 1898. President McKinley signed the resolution on 7 July 1898.[16] Another reason for Pettigrew's obscurity lies in the fact that he lost his re-election bid in 1900, an outcome he attributed to a number of factors, including his opposition to Hawaiian annexation. Pettigrew had angered powerful figures such as Senator Mark Hanna of Ohio, relating to a correspondent that "Mark Hanna and Roosevelt both came to South Dakota" to defeat him.[17] This loss at the polls effectively ended Pettigrew's political career. As a result, there was no encore through which the politician could re-establish himself. Yet another factor is the racist language and dubious science Pettigrew sometimes

14. Kazin, *The Populist Persuasion: An American History* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995), p. 28.

15. The cane now resides at the Pettigrew Home and Museum. For more about the queen's time in Washington, *see* Silva, *Aloha Betrayed*, pp. 158–59.

16. Siler, *Lost Kingdom*, p. 284; Budnick, *Stolen Kingdom*, pp. 173–81. The House voted 209 to 91 to approve the resolution on 15 June 1898, and the Senate voted 44 to 21 in favor on 6 July after first rejecting amendments to abolish contract labor in the islands and to require that annexation be approved by a vote of adult Hawaiians. Pettigrew viewed the annexation of Hawaii by joint resolution as a crooked victory that undermined constitutional principles. Since the resolution required a simple majority to pass, it was a tacit admission that the treaty proposed in 1897 could not garner the two-thirds Senate majority required for approval. Pettigrew to Ralph Wheelan, [27 June 1898], Letter Book, 12 May–4 July 1898, p. 412.

17. Pettigrew to J. O. Carter, 23 Nov. 1900, Letters to Carter, Bishop Museum.



Pettigrew appears here later in his career, following the annexation fight and the loss of his Senate seat in 1900.

used in his speeches opposing annexation.[18] They are distasteful to current sensibilities, and one is loath to resurrect anyone who made such arguments.

There are, however, some reasons to reconsider Pettigrew and his arguments against the annexation of Hawaii. For example, Pettigrew was one of just two anti-annexation politicians to visit the islands

18. *See*, for example, Pettigrew's speech of 2 July 1894, in which he says of the Hawaiians, "And now it is seriously proposed to annex this impoverished, degraded people-for they are as impoverished as they are degraded" (Pettigrew, *The Course of Empire* [New York: Boni & Liveright, 1920], p. 3).

during the debates. A little-studied speech he gave on that trip is important, since it lays out many of the objections the anti-annexationists had to Hawaii's acquisition. In addition, Pettigrew was the only anti-annexationist who had spent considerable time living in a territory, and he understood the problems territorial status presented residents. As he told Joseph Carter, "I lived in a territory seventeen years and know how these matters go. The United States cares nothing for its territories." While Dakota Territory certainly differed from the Hawaiian Islands, Pettigrew anticipated "complete and abject neglect" for any outlying territory. He wrote, "This is supposed to be a government of the people, and you will find that you will have a chance to run it as best you can, with little encouragement or assistance from the government at Washington."[19]

Another reason for looking anew at Pettigrew's opposition is that the lawmaker's stance on Hawaii illustrates a growing separation between those politicians initially drawn to the party of Lincoln over social issues and those who supported the party's economic agenda. Pettigrew had come to the Republican Party more for its principles than its economic platform.[20] The South Dakota senator increasingly opposed the economic domination of New England and the industrializing Midwest. When Lodge and other New Englanders argued that "our first object should be to hold our own market, . . . our next object should be to increase our outside markets by any possible device,"[21] Pettigrew disagreed. He supported the producer over the manufacturer, and he objected to the emerging manufacturing bias of the Republican Party. Pettigrew once characterized the issue of Hawaiian annexation as little more than "an attempt on the part of the great sugar planters . . . to share in the bounty now paid by this Government on domestic sugars."[22] He believed that business groups "looking outside the coun-

19. Pettigrew to J. O. Carter, 19 Sept. 1898, Letters to Carter, Bishop Museum.

20. Proto, *Rights of My People*, p. 58.

21. Henry Cabot Lodge, *Speeches and Addresses, 1884–1909* (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1909), p. 147. Lodge made his remarks in a speech about tariffs on 10 April 1894.

22. Quoted in Proto, *Rights of My People*, p. 60. *See also* Pettigrew to S. J. Conkin, 21 Oct. 1893, Letter Book, 13 Sept. 1893–24 Jan. 1894, pp. 443–44, PHM.

try for a chance to exploit and rob" found the perfect opportunity in Hawaii. In fact, the largest group of foreign capitalists living in Hawaii was of American extraction.[23] The great sugar magnates were more like the robber barons of industry than the yeoman farmers of South Dakota. Pettigrew's views about the sugar planters were reinforced when he visited the islands on a fact-finding trip.

After the 1893 overthrow of the queen, lame-duck Republican President Benjamin Harrison sent Congress a treaty of annexation, but lawmakers failed to take up the matter before his term ended. Harrison's successor, Democrat Grover Cleveland, withdrew the treaty from consideration because he disapproved of American involvement in the revolt. The issue of annexation remained in the background until the return of a Republican administration under William McKinley in 1897.[24]

In November of that year, Pettigrew spent ten days visiting the Hawaiian Islands on the homeward leg of a trip that had started with visits to Japan and China. As it happened, the senator traveled to Hawaii aboard the vessel *Australia* with Princess Kaiulani and her father, Archibald S. Cleghorn. There is no evidence that they met while traveling, but if such a meeting did take place, it is likely that Kaiulani and her father gave the senator information about the Hawaiian monarchy that he could not have received anywhere else. Though members of the Hawaiian Provisional Government had worked hard to discredit and disgrace Liliuokalani, they had been careful not to attack her niece, Kaiulani, possibly because they wanted Cleghorn to support their cause. The fact that Kaiulani had been in London when the 1893 coup occurred may also have been a factor. The princess returned home as heir to the Hawaiian throne. In both the United States capital and in Honolulu, rumors circulated that if Queen Liliuokalani formally abdicated and Kaiulani assumed the throne, American politicians would be unwilling to annex the islands.[25]

23. Pettigrew, *Triumphant Plutocracy*, pp. 310–11.

24. Gould, *Presidency of William McKinley,* p. 48.

25. *Pacific Commercial Advertiser* (Honolulu), 11 Nov. 1897; Liliuokalani to J. O. Carter, 24 Oct. 1897, Correspondence–Letters Chiefly from Liliuokalani, Folder 3, Aug.–Dec. 1897, Hawaii State Archives.

Pettigrew is seated in the second rickshaw from the right on one of the stops during his 1897 fact-finding trip.

One explanation as to why American politicians might have been willing to allow Kaiulani to lead the island nation when they had made no objection to the coup that deposed Liliuokalani was racism. Whereas Liliuokalani's parents were full-blooded Hawaiians, Kaiulani's were not. Her father was an Edinburgh-born Scotsman who had married Princess Miriam Kapili Kekauluohi Likelike. In addition, Kaiulani was educated not in a mission school but in England, where she became a well-known figure at Queen Victoria's court. Kaiulani gave the appearance of a beautiful, if somewhat exotic, western dignitary. Many viewed her as "white" rather than Hawaiian. In contrast, Queen Liliuokalani was unabashedly Hawaiian in appearance and attitude. Pro-annexation cartoons repeatedly mocked her appearance, making her appear more African than Hawaiian. In an America that was embarking on a Jim Crow future, such depictions weakened Liliuokalani's position in Washington. While society might accept Kaiulani as "white," they could not, or would not, do the same for Liliuokalani, especially

after she seemed to promote a "nativist" agenda that frightened missionaries and Americans alike.[26]

Whether from Kaiulani and Cleghorn or from someone else, South Dakota's anti-imperialist senator had had a chance to hear the Hawaiian side of the story before he visited with those whom the queen described as the "pseudo-Hawaiians" composing the provisional government.[27] "I have tried to talk with everyone who would talk with us on both sides of this question," press reports quoted Pettigrew as saying while still in Hawaii.[28] When the senator left Honolulu for San Francisco on board the *Gaelic* on 20 November 1897, fellow travelers included members of the Hui Hawaii Aloha Āina, or Hawaiian Patriotic League. Again, there is no conclusive evidence that Pettigrew visited with these representatives as they journeyed toward San Francisco, but it is entirely possible, given the fact-finding nature of his journey. Indeed, such discussions would help to explain why these delegates sought out Pettigrew, instead of some other senator, when they arrived in Washington, D.C., the following month. Pettigrew helped to arrange a meeting with Senator Hoar, and the Hawaiian delegates were able to submit petitions protesting annexation to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.[29]

As Alabama Senator John T. Morgan had done earlier that year, Pettigrew visited with leaders of the provisional government.[30] However, unlike Morgan, who was an expansionist who favored annexation, Pettigrew also visited with opponents of the new Hawaiian govern-

26. Liliuokalani, *Hawaii's Story* (Honolulu: Mutual Publishing, 1990), p. 1. For a discussion of Queen Liliuokalani's portrayal in the popular press, especially when it came to cartoons, *see* Silva, *Aloha Betrayed*, pp. 173–78.

27. Liliuokalani, *Hawaii's Story*, p. 322.

28. *Pacific Commercial Advertiser*, 19 Nov. 1897.

29. Ibid., 22 Nov. 1897; Silva, *Aloha Betrayed*, p. 158. It is unclear whether the delegates Silva discusses were the same individuals who embarked from Honolulu to San Francisco on 22 November alongside Pettigrew.

30. Pettigrew met with President Sanford B. Dole on 10 November 1897. *Pacific Commercial Advertiser*, 11 Nov. 1897. Morgan came to the islands in September 1897 along with Congressmen Joseph G. Cannon of Illinois, James A. Tawney of Minnesota, Henry C. Loudenslager of New Jersey, and Albert S. Berry of Kentucky. Ibid., 15 Sept. 1897.

ment. It may have been at the instigation of his host in Honolulu, Joseph Carter, that Pettigrew decided to visit an island other than Oahu. During his stay, Pettigrew traveled to the Island of Hawaii, the historic birthplace of Hawaii's first royal dynasty and the largest island in the archipelago. It was in Hilo, the island's largest city with a population of ten thousand, and not in Honolulu, that Pettigrew chose to give his only public speech.[31]

Pettigrew must have known what had happened to Morgan when he spoke at Kawaiaha'o Church in Honolulu two months earlier. There, the Alabama senator found himself engaged with a bilingual audience that was both literate and knowledgeable about the status of African Americans in the United States. Morgan used his speech to suggest that the fate of the native Hawaiian would not parallel the declining fortunes of America's black population. His audience left unconvinced, and a newspaper editorial about Morgan's speech offered the opinion that if the islands were annexed, Hawaiians would be like American blacks because their freedom would be taken away.[32]

While Morgan may have been surprised at the reception he received, Pettigrew had an awareness of what the local population's response had been and may have opted to speak in Hilo in order to connect with as many native Hawaiians as possible. His audience was less fluent in English than were those in Honolulu. Indeed, the Reverend S. L. Desha, pastor of Haili Church in Hilo, served as Pettigrew's interpreter, both during the speech and in the question-and-answer session that followed.[33] Generally, English-language proficiency was an important indicator of one's position on the Hawaiian Revolution. As a rule, the less English one spoke, the more likely one was to support the restoration of the monarchy. Finally, the Big Island was the home of Joseph Nāwahī, one of the most important leaders in the struggle against annexation.[34] It was from Hilo that the Hui Hawaii Aloha

31. For more on the history of Hawaii's royal dynasty and its origins, *see* Tabrah, *Hawaii*, pp. 10–33.

32. Proto, *Rights of My People*, p. 43; Silva, *Aloha Betrayed*, p. 148.

33. *Hawaiian Gazette* (Honolulu), 19 Nov. 1897.

34. Joseph Nāwahī was the editor of the Hawaiian-language newspaper *Ke Aloha Aina* and had served in Queen Liliuokalani's cabinet. Arrested by the provisional govern-

Āina, together with other voluntary associations, secured the signatures of over twenty-one thousand Hawaiians who opposed annexation and supported reinstating the queen—the petitions that Pettigrew would help to shepherd to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.[35]

Pettigrew and his traveling companion, former Idaho Senator Fred T. Dubois, clearly anticipated Kanaka Maoli participation in building the future of Hawaii, as their speeches at Hilo indicate.[36] Pettigrew

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ment in 1894, he likely contracted tuberculosis while in prison. After his death in 1896, his wife, Emma 'A'ima Nāwahī, carried on the effort to prevent annexation. Proto, *Rights of My People*, 143–46; Siler, *Lost Kingdom*, pp. 275–76.

35. Silva, *Aloha Betrayed*, pp. 124, 145–59.

36. Dubois was an anti-imperialist and, like Pettigrew, opposed Hawaiian annexation. He had lost his bid for re-election to the Senate in 1896, and although re-elected in 1900, he was not able to vote alongside Pettigrew in opposition to the joint resolution annex-

This idyllic street scene in Honolulu was recorded during Pettigrew's Hawaii visit.

acknowledged that most Americans believed that Hawaiians desired annexation to the United States. Dubois told the audience that Pettigrew would champion their cause, but that they should also do all they could "to inform the people of the United States of what you yourselves want," namely, restoration of the monarchy.[37] Pettigrew listened while one member of the audience related that Hawaiians had "always looked upon it [the United States] as a land of justice, and they now look to the United States to protect them as a father would his child." Dubois responded by saying the "people of the United States are fair and just."[38]

The only newspaper to cover Pettigrew's speech was the local *Hilo Tribune*, but its report was quickly picked up by other newspapers, including the *Pacific Commercial Advertiser* and the *Hawaiian Gazette*.[39] *The Pacific Commercial Advertiser*, which supported annexation, complimented Pettigrew for his "guarded remarks," as compared to the "outspoken" words of his traveling partner.[40] The *Hawaiian Gazette*, an anti-annexation newspaper, reported on various aspects of the speech, including its warm reception among the local population. In reality, Pettigrew's "guarded remarks" revealed that the trip to Hawaii had solidified his belief that annexation was unconstitutional. After meeting with leaders of the provisional government and the local Hawaiian population, Pettigrew was firmly of the view that annexation challenged the very principles of democratic government.[41] Not long after, he blamed the "New England idea that the rights of property are

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ing Hawaii in 1898. Pettigrew often relied on Dubois's behind-the-scenes work in his fight over annexation. *See* Pettigrew to F. T. Dubois, [Jan. 1898], Letter Book, 18 Jan.–9 Mar. 1898, pp. 163–64, PHM.

37. *Pacific Commercial Advertiser*, 19 Nov. 1897.

38. William Adam Russ, Jr., *The Hawaiian Republic (1894–98) and Its Struggle to Win Annexation* (Selinsgrove, Pa.: Susquehanna University Press, 1961), pp. 208–9.

39. The *Pacific Commercial Advertiser's* report appears on 19 Nov. 1897, but it is identified as a correspondent's report from Hilo dated 17 Nov. 1897; the *Hawaiian Gazette* also carries the same report on 19 Nov. 1897, also identified as a correspondent's report from 17 Nov. 1897.

40. *Pacific Commercial Advertiser*, 19 Nov. 1897.

41. *Hawaiian Gazette*, 19 Nov. 1897.

greater and more important than the rights of man" for promoting the annexation of Hawaii.[42]

In his speech to the Hawaiians gathered at Haili Church in Hilo, Pettigrew referred to the importance of allowing Kanaka Maoli participation in deciding the future of Hawaii. Unlike John Morgan, Pettigrew was not frightened at the prospect of citizens of color participating in the democratic process, evidence of his connection to the party of Lincoln rather than the Republican Party of 1897.[43] When he returned to Congress, Pettigrew opposed annexation because the treaty effectively disenfranchised native Hawaiians.[44] In the midst of the fight, a dejected Pettigrew wrote one constituent that the Republican Party "has degenerated into the absolute and complete control of the Wall Street gamblers and great combinations of capital, who are engaged in the occupation of plundering the producers of wealth in this country."[45] The Kanaka Maoli, in Pettigrew's eyes, represented the yeomen of Hawaii, and he equated the sugar magnates and businessmen who had led the revolution with the plutocracy. Years later he wrote, "The real strength of big business came over the issue of imperialism," adding that Hawaii was the first effort to "plunder abroad."[46]

The junto running Hawaii after the queen's overthrow feared the native Hawaiians and opposed native voting rights. Their fears had been compounded when the plans of 1893 went awry. In setting up the Republic of Hawaii in 1894, the provisional government required that those who wished to vote take a loyalty oath pledging to oppose any effort to restore the monarchy. Most native Hawaiians and many non-American residents refused to do so. As a result, only four thou-

42. Pettigrew to J. O. Andrews, 9 Dec. 1897, Letter Book, 27 June 1897–18 Jan. 1898, p. 248, PHM.

43. *Hawaiian Gazette*, 19 Nov. 1897. Morgan, an Alabama Democrat, had been a Confederate general during the Civil War. Given the role of the Grand Army of the Republic in state and national politics, Pettigrew's actions may be viewed as a continuation of the political discourse about the meaning of the American Civil War.

44. Pettigrew, *Course of Empire*, p. 133.

45. Pettigrew to A. Sutherland, 10 Jan. 1898, Letter Book, 27 June 1897–18 Jan. 1898, p. 453.

46. Pettigrew, *Triumphant Plutocracy*, p. 310.

sand men, mostly foreign-born, participated in the election.[47] From the provisional government's position, native Hawaiians threatened Hawaii's future with the United States, and allowing their participation in elections seemed dangerous. The presence on the petitions of more than twenty-one thousand signatures of men and women opposed to annexation challenged the provisional government's claim that a majority of the islands' population supported annexation.[48]

Pettigrew saw to it that the Hawaiian Patriotic League had access to Hoar and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee despite the fact that he thought monarchy was a poor form of government. He did so because he believed the Hawaiian "republic" was even worse, quipping that it was "a Limited Republic—limited to about four men," and because he had no great faith in the effectiveness of territorial governments.[49] Such an attitude differed from that of many of his colleagues, who assumed that the American flag brought political, economic, and social advancement.[50]

Throughout the annexation fight, Pettigrew continued to work tirelessly to secure Kanaka Maoli voting rights. Unlike his southern counterparts who opposed annexation because of the native presence, Pettigrew sought to ensure that local Hawaiians, especially those who had refused to take the provisional government's loyalty oath, were allowed to participate in the territorial system once Hawaii formally became a territory of the United States in August 1898.[51] Indeed, Petti-

47. Silva, *Aloha Betrayed*, p. 136. According to Pettigrew, the population of the islands comprised 24,407 Japanese, 21,616 Chinese, 15,191 Portuguese, and 39,504 Hawaiians, "leaving a balance of only 8,202, and of these about 3,500 are from America" (*Course of Empire*, p. 57).

48. Silva, *Aloha Betrayed*, p. 124. Actually, the "big five" sugar conglomerates were divided in their support of annexation, as in the case of British-born businessman Theophilus Harris Davies. *See* Theo. Davies, *Letters upon the Political Crisis in Hawaii* (Honolulu: Bulletin Printing Co., 1894), pp. 23–24.

49. Pettigrew's 2 July 1894 speech on the issue, "The Hawaii Islands," was reprinted in his book, *Course of Empire* (*see* p. 3). For his view of territorial government, *see* Pettigrew to J. O. Carter, 19 Sept. 1898.

50. Gould, *The Spanish-American War and President McKinley* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1982), p. 11.

51. Christopher Lasch, "The Anti-Imperialists, the Philippines, and the Inequality of Man," *Journal of Southern History* 24 (Aug. 1958): 319.

grew wanted a native Hawaiian to represent the territory in Congress. He told Joseph Carter, "If your people do not send a Kanaka to Congress as a Delegate, or at least one who sympathizes with the people of that country, . . . I shall feel as though we had worked in vain."[52]

Where did this belief, one that seemed so out of touch with his fellow politicians, come from? Unlike most other congressional representatives, Pettigrew began his political career when Dakota was still a territory. Many of the people he represented considered Washington politicians indifferent to the needs and desires of territorial residents.[53] Territorial status also limited participatory democracy, which is why Pettigrew opposed annexation and saw to it that Queen Liliuoklani and the Hawaiian Patriotic League had access to members of the Foreign Relations Committee in order to make their case for restoration of the monarchy. For Pettigrew, the question of whether Hawaii would be better off as a territorial possession of the United States or as an independent nation was not theoretical; it was a lived experience.

It is in Pettigrew's territorial career that we see the roots of his opposition to presidential and party policies. In the early 1880s, he allied himself with Republicans in the territory's northern section in order to undermine the power of the Yankton "oligarchy." Centered around the first territorial capital of Dakota Territory and constituting a significant non-farming faction, these "two hundred or so" citizens influential in the areas of business, banking, and land speculation often found their economic interests in conflict with that of their rural neighbors. This group of men wanted to keep Yankton the center of Dakota Territory's political, economic, and social world. Pettigrew, a resident of Sioux Falls who desired to create his own political base, challenged the traditional Republican leadership. Couching his criticisms as a rural-versus-mercantile clash, he often resorted to demagoguery and made a name for himself as an opponent of federal appointees.[54] This mode of operating continued in his later career. When Pettigrew

52. Pettigrew to Carter, 13 Mar. 1900, Letters to Carter, Bishop Museum.

53. Pettigrew to J. O. Carter, 19 Sept. 1898.

54. Howard R. Lamar, *Dakota Territory, 1861–1889: A Study of Frontier Politics* (Fargo, N.Dak.: Institute for Regional Studies, 1996), pp. 196–97, 244–46. Often these attacks covered Pettigrew's real objective, which was to promote his own opportunities.

emerged as a player on the national scene, he did not have the unwavering support of a particular group of voters; instead, he had a shifting set of allies, and as the debates over annexation began in earnest, he had no ready-made constituency upon which to count for support.

As did many anti-imperialists, Pettigrew looked to history for his political understanding of what America should or should not do. Whereas Lodge, Roosevelt, and perhaps McKinley looked at what America might become, Pettigrew worried that the future they envisioned trampled on the very principles they purported to advance. He dismissed as opportunism rather than principled reasoning Lodge's contention that Hawaii's annexation portended a bright future and an opportunity to assuage the economic situation at home.[55] As researcher Tom Coffman has noted, control of the Hawaiian Islands had become even more important in light of discussions about a possible canal "across the isthmus of the Americas."[56] These developments suggest that Pettigrew's work with, and on behalf of, the Populists might have as much to do with Populist opposition to America's growing muscularity in foreign affairs and defending the goals and objectives of "the Founding Fathers" as with the country's economic woes, including the issue of free silver.[57]

Numerous studies of both Populism and the anti-imperialist struggle of the 1890s exist at the national level.[58] South Dakota Populism has also had a fair number of studies, most recently R. Alton Lee's *Principle over Party*,[59] but an examination of how Populism on the Northern

55. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, p. 302.

56. Tom Coffman, *Nation Within: The History of American Occupation of Hawaii* (Kihei, Hawaii: Koa Books, 2009), p. 178.

57. Worth Robert Miller, "Farmers and Third-Party Politics," in Charles W. Calhoun, ed., *The Gilded Age: Essays on the Origins of Modern America* (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1996), p. 236.

58. For this study, the most important works on anti-imperialism are Beisner, *Twelve against Empire*; Schirmer, *Republic or Empire*; and Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*. For Populism, *see* O. Gene Clanton, *Kansas Populism: Men and Ideas* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1969), and Kazin, *Populist Persuasion*.

59. *See*, for example, William C. Pratt, "South Dakota Populism and Its Historians," *South Dakota History* 22 (Winter 1992): 309–29; D. Jerome Tweton, "Considering Why Populism Succeeded in South Dakota and Failed in North Dakota," ibid., pp. 330–44; Terrence J. Lindell, "Populists in Power: The Problems of the Andrew E. Lee Admin-



Cartoons of the day poked fun at Uncle Sam's appetite for new territories, including the Sandwich Islands, another name for Hawaii. President William McKinley is shown serving the meal.

Great Plains intersected with the anti-imperialism debates of the 1890s is missing. Such an exploration might reveal a larger Populist world view than scholars have heretofore portrayed. Such a study might also move Pettigrew from the periphery of both movements into a more prominent position and go some distance toward rehabilitating his political reputation in South Dakota by revealing more consistency in his actions than earlier writers have suggested.

The standard interpretation of Pettigrew's involvement with the Populists from scholars such as Kenneth E. Hendrickson, Jr., is that he feared these farmers-turned-politicians would "destroy the Republican party" on the agrarian plains, and "if principle must be abandoned; so

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istration in South Dakota," ibid., pp. 345–65; Daryl Webb, "'Just Principles Never Die': Brown County Populists, 1890–1900," ibid., pp. 366–99; and R. Alton Lee, *Principle over Party: The Farmers' Alliance and Populism in South Dakota, 1880–1900* (Pierre: South Dakota State Historical Society Press, 2011).

be it."[60] Implicit is the notion that the senator would ride Populism for as long as necessary before returning to the Republican fold. This interpretation is somewhat unfair, since Pettigrew and the Populists shared the same position on a key issue in foreign affairs.[61] He saw the Republican effort to annex Hawaii as unconstitutional;[62] so did many Populists.

Pettigrew and the Populists also shared similar opinions on a matter of more immediate importance. Pettigrew's longstanding opposition to federal patronage played well with his rural constituents, many of whom were Populists. His letters and speeches show a continual deriding of federal appointees, a sniping that had its roots in a shift in the patronage system that dated back nearly a generation.[63] By the time Pettigrew became Dakota Territory's non-voting congressional delegate in 1881, the territorial governor exercised greater control over federal patronage than did its congressional representative. By taking on the Republican establishment over key issues, including Hawaii's annexation, Pettigrew lost even more influence over patronage appointments.[64] The South Dakota Republican senator sided with Democratic President Grover Cleveland, who withdrew the proposed Hawaiian annexation treaty. Watching as President William McKinley later maneuvered Hawaiian annexation through Congress, Pettigrew wrote that it was an "outrage" and that he was "ashamed of the whole affair."[65] He was clearly at odds on Hawaii with Presidents Harrison and McKinley, men of his own party.

60. Hendrickson, "The Public Career of Richard F. Pettigrew of South Dakota, 1848–1926," *South Dakota Historical Collections* 34 (1968): 200.

61. Pettigrew wrote numerous letters saying he was a Populist, but he never switched his party affiliation in the United States Senate. *See*, for example, Pettigrew to Andrew E. Lee, Letter Book, 7 Dec. 1896–20 Apr. 1897, p. 414, and Pettigrew to S. L. Tate, ibid., p. 667, PHM.

62. Pettigrew to W. R. Hearst, 17 June 1898, Letter Book, 12 May–4 July 1898, pp. 333–35.

63. *See*, for example, Pettigrew to J. B. Wallbridge, 28 Sept. 1894, Letter Book, 13 Sept. 1893–24 Jan. 1894, p. 149; Pettigrew to J. H. Baldwin, 18 May 1894, Letter Book, 26 Apr. 1894–9 June 1894, p. 215, PHM.

64. Lamar, *Dakota Territory*, p. 162; Pettigrew to H. W. Sawyer, 23 Apr. 1897, Letter Book, 23 Apr.– 22 June 1897, p. 7, PHM.

65. Siler, *Lost Kingdom*, p. 285. For more on Cleveland's opposition to Hawaiian annexation, *see* Herring, *From Colony to Superpower*, pp. 305–6.

Washington, D.C., however, was neither Yankton nor Bismarck. McKinley was in earnest when he told Pettigrew that the only way to secure South Dakota's patronage possibilities was to "support the Republican ticket" without any caveats. This directive meant accepting both a platform that adopted a single gold standard and Hawaiian annexation.[66] Pettigrew could do neither. Nor could he resist attacking the powerful Republican leader Mark Hanna, whom he viewed as a chief opponent on these issues.[67] Unfortunately for Pettigrew, national Republican leaders had long memories and were just as determined to see their agendas through. Indeed, by the end of the annexation debate, Hanna had decided "to end the political career of his maverick enemy," in the words of historian Lewis L. Gould.[68]

The traditional story is that Pettigrew's opposition to annexation was embedded in his free-silver sentiments, a position that led him to a working alliance with the People's Party in the 1890s. Pettigrew's stance as a "silverite" was well known, but his Populist bent drew its strength from issues other than silver.[69] For Pettigrew, America's tariff policy was vital to the economic well-being of his constituents, and it was over tariff policy that Pettigrew and William McKinley had a falling out in 1890. This falling out found its way into the Hawaii question.

McKinley and Pettigrew both championed protective tariff policy at the start of the 1890s, but during the crafting of the McKinley Tariff, McKinley became an advocate of James G. Blaine's idea of "reciprocity." The goal, for Congress, was to reduce tariff rates via treaty with the nation's trading partners. As Gould characterized McKinley's position, such action was necessary to "forestall more drastic revision of protected schedules and to expand American market overseas."[70] Pettigrew disagreed, arguing that America's money "ought to be retained

66. Pettigrew to Thomas A. Brown, 4 May 1896, Letter Book, 5 Feb.–10 June 1896, p. 389, PHM.

67. Fanebust, *Echoes of November*, pp. 335–36.

68. Gould, *Presidency of William McKinley*, p. 225; Pettigrew to J. O. Carter, 23 Nov. 1900.

69. *See* Fanebust, *Echoes of November*, p. 280. Pettigrew's free-silver agitation reached its zenith at the Republican National Convention at Saint Louis in 1896. For a synopsis, *see* Hendrickson, "Public Career of Richard F. Pettigrew," pp. 242–43.

70. Gould, *Spanish-American War*, p. 3.

by her people" instead of being sent to trading partners elsewhere in the world. Reciprocity, for Pettigrew, meant that foreign elites were taking money away from American farmers.[71]

Reciprocity had been a bonanza for Hawaii's sugar magnates. After the first reciprocity treaty of 1875, the number of acres devoted to sugar production jumped from 12,000 to 125,000 in 1891. Proponents of annexation argued that reciprocity had brought Hawaii even closer to the United States economically and made the islands more important to the United States as a market for goods. However, the McKinley Tariff Act of 1890 did away with the reciprocity advantage Hawaii had enjoyed. While it put in place high new tariffs on many products, its removal of tariffs on sugar and a few other products opened American markets to overseas sugar from anywhere. In addition, the act put in place a bounty, or subsidy, of two cents per pound for American producers of sugar. These economic factors helped persuade some business interests in Hawaii to support annexation, which some islanders viewed as an effort by sugar planters to cash in on the sugar bounty paid by the McKinley Tariff.[72]

As some historians see it, Hawaii represented for McKinley and his supporters an opportunity to prove that "good business and proper morality would fuse" as the flag moved across the Pacific Ocean.[73] Pettigrew, concerned with the plight of rural Dakotans, disagreed. He believed that the 1875 reciprocity treaty had hurt American farmers of wool, fruit, and sugar and that annexation would be another mistake.

71. R. F. Pettigrew to L. K. Lord, 10 Oct. 1893, Letter Book, 13 Sept. 1893–24 Jan. 1894, p. 395. *See also* R. F. Pettigrew, "Submarine Cable to Hawaii, Speech" (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1895), p. 17.

72. Joseph A. Fry, "Phases of Empire: Late Nineteenth-Century U.S. Foreign Relations," in Charles W. Calhoun, ed., *The Gilded Age: Essays on the Origins of Modern America* (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1996), p. 271; Hendrickson, "Public Career of Richard F. Pettigrew," p. 253. For more on the concerns of business interests over Hawaii's losing reciprocity, *see* Lorrin A. Thurston, *Statement of Reasons from an American Standpoint: 1. Why the Hawaian Reciprocity Treaty Ought Not Be Abrogated by the Tariff Bill; and 2. Why It Should Not, On Its Merits, Be Abrogated At All* (Washington, D.C.: Gibson, 1897), pp. 4, 13.

73. Gould, *Spanish-American War*, p. 63.

He was concerned that annexation would hurt the beet-sugar industry in the United States, in particular.[74]

Agricultural data of the time give context to Pettigrew's concerns about United States expansion into Hawaii. In the generation leading up to annexation, the wholesale price index for farm products had declined by 50 percent. Dakota farmers were paying the railroads a bushel of grain for every bushel of grain they shipped to market. Clearly, Pettigrew felt some obligation to defend his constituents against a set of economic policies that seemed to favor the economic trusts or, as Pettigrew might term them, the "plutocracy," over the small farmer of South Dakota.[75]

74. Pettigrew, *Course of Empire*, pp. 30–32.

75. Miller, "Farmers and Third-Party Politics," pp. 237–38; Pettigrew to Henry G. Hinckley, 13 Dec. 1897, Letter Book, 27 June 1897–18 Jan. 1898, pp. 290–91; Pettigrew to U. S. G. Cherry, 20 Jan. 1898, ibid., p. 32.

In this depiction, Uncle Sam and Hawaii's provisional government appear at the opposite end of a see-saw from Liliuokalani, with sugar as the fulcrum.

Despite all of these proposed reasons for opposing annexation, an important question remains: Why was Pettigrew, as he stated in 1895, "ready to stake my reputation on my record" in the annexation issue?[76] Few voters were interested in foreign affairs during the 1890s—between 10 and 20 percent, one study says—particularly during the depression-filled years of the post-1893 period. One possible reason for Pettigrew's stance against annexation might be due to the composition of South Dakota's population. Many people of German descent had come to the United States to be free of the imperialism and militarism of their native land.[77] Pettigrew may have thought this voting block would side with him on this issue. There was more, however.

Many assume that Pettigrew opposed annexation out of spite—that he wanted to embarrass the McKinley administration, especially after the 1896 Republican convention in Saint Louis refused to consider a pro-silver or bi-metalist plank for its platform.[78] Such an interpretation ignores the senator's view of history. He believed overseas annexation marked the end for American exceptionalism—the idea dating to French traveler Alexis de Tocqueville that American democracy was truly different than political systems in other countries[79]—since it could place the United States among the ranks of colonial powers. Although said in response to America's entry into the Philippines, many opponents of Hawaiian annexation shared a sentiment similar to the one conveyed in the saying, "Dewey took Manila with the loss of one man—and all our institutions."[80]

Historian Paul A. Kramer has argued that the debate over Hawaii also involved a more fundamental problem posed by the "explicitly racial character" of the United States' territorial models: "The Consti-

76. Pettigrew to E. W. Caldwell, 18 Mar. 1895, Letter Book, 15 Feb. 1895–5 Feb. 1896, p. 181, PHM.

77. George F. Pearce, "Assessing Public Opinion: Editorial Comment and the Annexation of Hawaii: A Case Study," *Pacific Historical Review* 43 (Aug. 1974): 328; Schirmer, *Republic or Empire*, p. 176.

78. Fanebust, *Echoes of November*, p. 278.

79. *See* de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America and Two Essays on America*, trans. Gerald Bevan (London: Penguin Books, 2003), p. 36; Pettigrew, *Course of Empire*, p. 75.

80. Quoted in Geoffrey Blodgett, *The Gentle Reformers: Massachusetts Democrats in the Cleveland Era* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 267.

tution did not follow the flag; lagging somewhat behind it, the Constitution followed the race."[81] The implication is that for Americans of the era, it would have been thought a mistake to enfranchise groups such as the majority populations of Hawaii, which were non-white and "incapable of self-government."[82] As another scholar notes, until the debate over Hawaii erupted, "all U.S. territories had been intended as European American settler colonies, if not at the time of initial acquisition, then at least by the time Congress had organized a territorial government."[83] Congress organized territorial governments on the assumption that the region would settled by European Americans. The climate, the various races composing Hawaii's population, and the fact that those who had overthrown the crown had "succeeded in gaining title to nearly all the land" made it unlikely that there would be a huge influx of European American settlers to Hawaii.[84]

As the debates over annexation heated up, both sides began to comb the pages of the past for historical precedents. For those who sought to acquire Hawaii without having to go through the traditional treaty process, Texas served as a logical precedent. Lacking the two-thirds majority vote needed to ratify an annexation treaty in the Senate, supporters put forward a joint resolution allowing for annexation, which passed Congress by a simple majority in February 1845. Proponents also used the Alaskan purchase of 1867 to counteract any debate about the acquisition of territory not contiguous with the United States. For those opposed to annexation, Santo Domingo served as a useful foil. Promoters of Hawaiian annexation were using the same arguments President Grant gave for attempting to acquire Santo Domingo in 1866.[85] Congress, however, had rejected annexing the island

81. Paul A. Kramer, *The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, & the Philippines* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), p. 162. An earlier work by Lanny Thompson clearly states that the Hawaii situation was different than Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Guam, all territories the United States secured at the Treaty of Paris (1898). *See* Thompson, "The Imperial Republic: A Comparison of the Insular Territories under U.S. Dominion," *Pacific Historical Review* 71 (November 2002): 535.

82. Kramer, *Blood of Government*, p. 163.

83. Thompson, "Imperial Republic," p. 537.

84. Pettigrew, *Course of Empire*, pp. 1–4.

85. Joe B. Frantz, *Texas: A Bicentennial History* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1976),

in part because its residents were not desirable as citizens (to admit them would have been to extend American citizenship to 200,000 "ignorant Catholic Spanish negroes," in the words of influential journalist E. L. Godkin of *The Nation*[86]), and their history showed they were incapable of "self-government."[87] Why was Hawaii, with its ethnic Chinese, Filipino, and Japanese residents, different?

For the past fifty years, scholars examining annexation have viewed the racial overtones of the debates as evidence of the influence of Social Darwinism on America's political leaders.[88] More was at work than just racism, however. Pettigrew and others equated republican values with family life. Hawaiians, Pettigrew argued, were unable to create a stable life because the sugar planters had imported more men than women. On the Senate floor on 2 July 1894, Pettigrew pointed out that available data suggested a two-to-one imbalance between males and females in the Hawaiian Islands—58,714 males to 31,276 females—making a grand total of 89,990. The disparity occurred in every race except among native Hawaiians, reaching as high as 18 to 1 among the Chinese, and 5 to 1 among the Japanese. The implication, Pettigrew argued, was that "the home, the heart of American institutions, is almost unknown" to many inhabitants of the islands of the day.[89] In addition to the centrality of familial stability, Republican ideology had long stressed the importance of literacy for its citizens. Similar arguments appeared in Pettigrew's opposition to Hawaii's annexation.[90]

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p. 85; Geoffrey L. Cabot, "Hawaiian Annexation Spoken before Massachusetts Reform Club Nov. 12, 1897," p. 13, PH B B 5 E 4 [folder 4], PHM; "Hawaiian Annexation and San Domingo," pamphlet, p. 1, ibid. [folder 5]; R. F. Pettigrew, "Annexation of Hawaiian Islands: Speech of Hon. Richard F. Pettigrew of South Dakota in the Senate of the United States June 22 and 23, 1898" (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1898), p. 9.

86. Quoted in Beisner, *Twelve against Empire*, p. 72.

87. Pettigrew, "Annexation of Hawaiian Islands," p. 9.

88. Lasch, "Anti-Imperialists, the Philippines, and the Inequality of Man," p. 330; Beisner, *Twelve against Empire*, pp. 27, 181; Silva, *Aloha Betrayed*, p. 53; Proto, *Rights of My People*, pp. 19, 31.

89. Pettigrew, *Course of Empire*, pp. 11–13.

90. *See*, for example, Pettigrew, *Course of Empire*, p. 64. He mentions Hawaiian laborers from several races as being "about the most discouraging material to make a republic of," unable to read or write and having "little regard for their own liberty or the liberty of others."

While Pettigrew played upon racist sentiments in making these arguments, he held firm to traditional Republican ideology concerning a "republic." A republic required the franchise of its citizens, and if the proposed Hawaiian Constitution would not do it, Pettigrew would. Toward that end, the senator introduced a bill that would have altered the Hawaiian Constitution. It promised voting rights to "all males over the age of 21, born or naturalized" in the islands. Interestingly, in Pettigrew's proposal, voters could vote in either Hawaiian or English. The resolution was soundly defeated, with only sixteen senators voting in the affirmative.[91] For Pettigrew, this outcome reflected just how uninterested his colleagues were in democratic principles.

One must remember that Pettigrew and other founders of South Dakota had used the language of classical republicanism in their drive for statehood. Terms such as "commonwealth" and "yeoman" stood in opposition to tyranny and secrecy. Hawaii's revolution had emerged out of secret societies, and the resulting government had disenfranchised important elements of the Hawaiian community. In South Dakota, the constitution had ensured that citizens enjoyed the right of petition.[92] A majority of Hawaiian residents, native and immigrant, did not enjoy this or even more basic privileges. Instead, the Republic was "granting extraordinary rights to immigrant whites while systematically denying those rights to Japanese and other Asian immigrants."[93] One observer writes that the provisional government, after failing to convince President Grover Cleveland to move ahead with annexation, "enacted a constitution that made it even more difficult for impoverished or poorly educated Hawaiians, Portuguese, or Chinese to serve in the legislature or to vote for senators. In effect, it further disenfranchised much of the population."[94] For Pettigrew, the Republican Party was turning away from its beginnings as the party of liberty, equality,

91. Pettigrew to J. O. Carter, 5 May 1900, Letters to Carter, Bishop Museum.

92. Michael Mullin and Jon Lauck, "South Dakota's Constitution: Harkening Backward, Foreshadowing a Future," in *The Constitutionalism of American States*, ed. George E. Connor and Christopher W. Hammons (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2008), pp. 585, 590.

93. Coffman, *Nation Within*, p. 198.

94. Siler, *Lost Kingdom*, p. 253.

and opportunity. He feared it had become the party of plutocracy.[95]

For Republican supporters of Hawaiian annexation, Hawaii was not an issue addressed in isolation. It was part of a much larger global vision. In March 1895, for example, Henry Cabot Lodge took to the Senate floor to argue that Great Britain was trying to contain the United States by encircling it with strategically located coaling stations for its ships. The British had already done so in the Atlantic, and British stations in Fiji and Vancouver Island suggested that something similar was occurring in the Pacific. Using a map to convey his point, Lodge called Hawaii "the key to the Pacific . . . the one place where the hand of England has not yet been reached out." To throw away those islands, he added, would be "madness."[96]

At the time of these debates over Hawaii, Alfred T. Mahan's *The Influence of Sea Power on History* was fresh on the scene. Though Mahan's focus was on events a century earlier, he hoped readers would apply the lessons he laid out to the contemporary world, enabling leaders to learn "the skilful conduct of war in the future."[97] For Lodge, Hawaii was part of a much larger and more important international game. Pettigrew responded by exclaiming that he was "tired of hearing Senators . . . talk to the American people about the fear of England."[98] For Lodge, the debate over Hawaii was about being able to challenge England; for Pettigrew, Hawaii was about constitutional principles.

Whether or not Lodge really believed that England was trying to encircle America, the rhetoric represented a decided shift in American foreign policy. The United States wanted to take its place on the world's stage, and it was now willing to look beyond the American continent to secure that place. Before beginning his study, Mahan believed

95. Similarly, a newspaper editorial of the day foresaw powerful financial interests at work when it announced that it "did not want a rotten-borough State 2,000 miles away, with two more Sugar Trust and loot-hunting Senators" (*New York World*, 18 May 1898, quoted in Russ, *Hawaiian Republic*, p. 317).

96. Quoted in David Healy, *US Expansionism*, p. 25. *See also* Henry Cabot Lodge, "England, Venezuela, and the Monroe Doctrine," *North American Review* (June 1895): 658.

97. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1890), p. 2. Originally published in 1890, Mahan's study provided the philosophical foundation for many leaders of the Republican Party in their debates about Hawaii.

98. Quoted in Healy, *US Expansionism*, p. 25. In one Senate speech, Pettigrew accused Lodge of pandering to fear. *See* Pettigrew, "Submarine Cable to Hawaii Speech," p. 3.

that overseas expansion led to government centralization, just as Pettigrew did. Mahan's views changed during the course of his research, however, and during the turbulent 1890s, he began to argue that territorial acquisitions offered an opportunity to improve the welfare of the nation at large. *The Influence of Sea Power* conveyed a sense that all nations were after Pacific colonies. If the United States did not annex Hawaii, some argued, Great Britain certainly would. If either country waited too long, then Japan would annex the islands.[99] In effect, Mahan's book justified a change in American foreign policy. This new policy required a new set of politicians, men no longer content to control Hawaii's ports alone. Lodge and his allies were interested in pushing "American economic and political power throughout the world,"[100] and Hawaii would be the first step in this new effort. Pettigrew rejected this mentality.

As noted earlier, Pettigrew often supported rural rather than industrial interests in the Senate. His speeches on the Hawaiian matter suggest that he had concerns about how agricultural interests would benefit from such an acquisition. He pointed out that the value of the wheat crop in one North Dakota county was four times as large as the total value of all vessels engaged exclusively in the Hawaiian trade. Why would the United States focus its attention on Hawaii when an important segment of the American economy needed help?[101] In another speech, Pettigrew stated, "All that a man in the Hawaiian Islands is obliged to do to gain a living is to plant a banana tree and steal a fishing line." Hawaiians had no need to import American goods, a pillar of the pro-annexationist argument.[102] Moreover, Pettigrew was genuinely concerned with the plight of the Kanaka Maoli. In one 1895 speech, the senator equated the treatment of the native Hawaiians at the hands of Hawaii's provisional government with that of the southern states toward the African American.[103] Laborers in Hawaii, he said, were "virtu-

99. William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, 2d ed. (New York: Delta Books, 1972), p. 32; Coffman, *Nation Within,* p. 254.

100. Williams, *Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, pp. 46–47.

101. Pettigrew, *Course of Empire*, p. 30

102. Ibid., p. 3.

103. Ibid., p. 67.

ally slaves."[104] Having fought a Civil War to free African Americans and punish the slaveholding southern elite, why would the United States bring a late nineteenth-century equivalent in the form of sugar plantation holders into the American fabric, even if only as a territory?

Taken together, his trip to Hawaii, his experience as a territorial resident, his reading of history, and his commitment to rural rather than urban economic issues led Pettigrew to oppose Hawaii's annexation. While his free-silver predilection certainly shaped his arguments, his opposition to overseas expansion came from specific political positions that put him at odds with the emerging elite of the Republican Party.[105] As historian Robert L. Beisner noted, discussions about overseas territorial expansion forced politicians to debate the issues of "party loyalty, self-government, race, and national character."[106] Pettigrew's career gives us an indication of how one man tried to navigate these debates.

Though Pettigrew desperately wanted to remain in politics, his unwillingness to be a "team player" came back to haunt him in the general election of 1900. In the final days of that campaign, Pettigrew reflected publicly during a speech in Sioux Falls that he had never left the Republican Party; rather, it had left him. The *Sioux Falls Daily Argus-Leader*, while giving front-page coverage to the anticipated Republican victory, buried its coverage of the Pettigrew speech on page six under the headline, "Pettigrew peeps."[107] A new Republican philosophy was emerging, one that was more muscular and active in the world at large than previously. Pettigrew feared this new direction would lead America to disaster—trading its honorable past as a republic for a future as an empire. During the 1900 campaign, both Mark Hanna and Theodore Roosevelt had visited South Dakota to challenge Pettigrew's Republican credentials.[108] State leaders listened, and Pettigrew found himself a man without a party. His political career was over, and so, too, was Hawaii's independence.

104. Ibid., p. 64.

105. Proto, *Rights of My People*, p. 58

106. Beisner, *Twelve against Empire*, pp. viii–ix.

107. *Sioux Falls Daily Argus-Leader*, 1 Nov. 1900. *See also* Fanebust, *Echoes of November*, p. 280.

108. Schirmer, *Republic or Empire*, p. 210.

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On the cover: In 1897, South Dakota Senator Richard F. Pettigrew (bottom, center) visited Honolulu (top) and other points in the Hawaiian Islands as part of a fact-finding mission. In this issue, Michael J. Mullin examines Pettigrew's stance on the controversial issue of Hawaiian annexation.